The conventional wisdom is that government decentralization promotes policy innovation because it allows for several simultaneous experiments by local governments. However, this ignores a learning externality: successful policy experiments provide useful information for all governments. Local governments will ignore this externality, but a central government should take it into account. This paper uses a social learning model to compare policy innovation under centralization and decentralization. Centralization leads to more policy innovation if the local governments are relatively homogeneous or large in number. However, decentralization may induce more policy innovation if there are multiple experimental policies available.
Introduction
One of the textbook arguments for government decentralization is that it promotes policy innovation. 1 As the above quote from Justice Brandeis suggests, local governments such as states and municipalities are often thought of as laboratories of democracy" with each one independently pursuing di erent policy experiments. Decentralizing policy choice to local governments has the advantage that several di erent policies are considered simultaneously. In contrast the central government only examines one policy at a time and so will more slowly uncover superior new policy choices. This argument has played a central role in the trend towards decentralization in the U.S. The New York Times, 24 February 1997, with the most prominent example being the devolution of the welfare system to the states. 2 However, this reasoning ignores an important aspect of the policy innovation process. Because successful policy experiments are eventually emulated, they have a public good component. Experiments bene t not just the innovating government but also potential imitators, and so local governments have an incentive to free-ride o their neighbors. Alternatively, a central government should take this learning externality into account when it is deciding whether to consider a policy experiment. This paper characterizes conditions under which decentralization local government decision-making leads to more policy innovation than centralization central government decision-making. The model is a game theoretic version of the bandit problem. Policymakers must choose between a sure policy, one with a known payo , and an experimental policy, which may or may not have a superior payo . For example an experimental wel-fare policy involving time limits or worker training might greatly reduce future case-loads but could instead result in even higher poverty rates. Each policy-maker must pick a sequence of policies with the objective of maximizing his present discounted ow of payo s. The experimental policy may bethe appropriate choice even when it has a lower expected current payo because its use also reveals information about its underlying payo distribution. Under decentralization, two local policy-makers make decisions while observing one another's decisions and payo s. Although the experimental policy may be better suited to one policy-maker than the other, a neighbor's experience will provide valuable information because the local payo s are correlated. The decentralized outcome typically involves under-experimentation relative to the social optimum because local policy-makers do not take into account the informational externality their experiments provide. That is, a local policy-maker may free-ride o his neighbor's experiment. 3 Under centralization, a single policy-maker must choose a uniform policy for both local governments. While the central policy-maker internalizes the learning externality, he only has access to a coarse set of policy instruments. The centralized outcome may involve under-or over-experimentation relative to the social optimum.
Centralization involves greater experimentation than decentralization if and only if there is a large positive correlation between the local experimental payo s. 4 This is because greater correlation increases the chance that the experimental policy is suitable for both local governments, and thus increases the appeal of centralized experimentation. Alternatively, greater correlation increases the severity of the free-rider e ect and reduces decentralized experimentation. Increasing the number of local governments induces relatively more experimentation under centralization, since both the centralized experimental payo and the free-rider e ect grow with the number of governments. However, increasing the number of experimental policies may induce more decentralized experimentation. This is because only decentralization can take advantage of a strategic complementarity, namely each local government using a di erent experimental policy. Finally, the model is generalized to allow for politically motivated local policy-makers. While it is often argued that local policy-makers introduce innovations as a means to get elected to higher political o ce, this result depends crucially on how the election process is modeled: political motivations may actually lead to less decentralized experimentation. In total these results suggest that contrary to conventional wisdom decentralization does not always induce more policy experimentation.
One crucial assumption in the model is that the central government is restricted to using a uniform policy in all regions. There are several reasons to think this is a realistic characterization. First, in many countries local governments have certain sovereign powers and cannot beforced to implement distinct policies from their neighbors. For example the 10th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is typically interpreted as reserving certain policies to the states. Second, there may be political resistance to di erential policies emanating from the central government. Voters and representatives from regions where the least favorable experiments are to be used may try to block the policy. Third, even if the central government could simultaneously implement distinct policies it may be di cult for it to monitor or appropriately evaluate the results due to informational limits. Finally, in practice centralized policies are almost always uniform in industrialized countries. This paper is linked to two areas of active current research. The rst involves the policy implications of federalist structures. The most closely related papers are Kollman et al 19 and Rose-Ackerman 28 . Kollman et al 19 theoretically investigate the role of central and local governments as innovators but impose rather than endogenize each government's learning strategy. Rose-Ackerman 28 considers a model of local government innovation in which politicians are rewarded for their policy performance relative to their neighbors, but there is no strategic interaction between politicians. My paper builds on their work by allowing local governments to free-ride o one another's experiments. 5 Other papers consider how centralization or decentralization in uences voting behavior. Besley and Coate 6 show that centralization induces voters to select high spending representatives to take advantage of the scal commons. Rose-Ackerman 27 presents a model in which v oter policy preferences di er at the central versus local level due to spillovers. My work is complementary to these papers because it focuses on strategic policy-making rather than voter behavior. Several recent papers consider the interaction between central and local governments. Persson and Tabellini 24 , 25 examine how this interaction in uences the riskiness of local policies, Dixit and Londregan 14 consider its in uence on redistribution policies, and Cremer and Palfrey 11 examine the e ect of federal mandates on local governments. Finally, the theory here can be connected to recent empirical work on federalism. Strumpf and OberholzerGee 32 show that greater preference heterogeneity induces scal decentralization. This suggests that federal structures tend to be e cient, since I show that decentralization induces more policy experimentation when local governments are dissimilar. Very thorough surveys of the scal federalism literature are contained in Inman and Rubinfeld 17 and Oates 23 .
The second research area involves learning externalities in multiple person settings. Bolton and Harris 9 analyze how several identical agents choose between a risky and safe action when they can observe one another. Bala and Goyal 1 present a related model and an overview of the social learning literature. The contribution of my w ork is to allow for heterogeneous learning agents 6 and more than two strategic actions. Also, the main focus of the social learning literature is determining whether the private equilibrium is socially optimal while my paper compares the private decentralized outcome with the constrained uniform centralized outcome. Comparing these second best outcomes is potentially of interest in other settings. For example, an organizational theorist might beinterested in which types of decisions are best decentralized within a rm. 6 I am only aware of two papers in this literature which allow for inter-player experimental payo heterogeneity. Smith and Sorensen 31 consider a sequential learning problem where each agent's type in uences his payo and is private knowledge. Bergemann and Valimaki 2 have agents whose payo s follow a known ranking. My model allows for a more general form of heterogeneity. The players' payo s are correlated and their relative v alues may v ary over time.
Empirical Motivation
It is important to empirically document that governments copy policies from one another. Political scientists have extensively studied such emulation between U.S. states. The most well-known anecdote involves the California Fair Trade Law of 1931 which was copied verbatim by ten other states, including two serious typographical errors Walker 33 . It is not di cult to nd many current examples of state policy copying. 7 There is also more formal empirical work which shows that policies di use between states. This policy di usion seems to be the result of active observation and contact between states. Freeman 15 surveys state legislators and nds that they evaluate policies in other states before making their own policy proposals. Similarly, Walker 33 concludes from his survey of state administrators that they frequently communicate with counterparts in other states. These contacts have developed into both formal and informal policy networks" where information on new policies are exchanged see the survey in Mintrom 21 . For example, the National Governors Association has established the Center for Best Practices which seeks to identify and and share states' best practices and innovations" and serves as a clearinghouse of policy evaluations www.nga.org CBP About.asp. 9 In addition to these politician networks, there are also several organizations which link professional support sta as well as organizations such as the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations which provides model legislation based on state policy experiments.
While this brief review shows there is evidence of policy copying, the previous literature 7 Kansas' new local government w elfare program is modeled on an identical Vermont plan Boston Globe, 25 May 1999; Alabama's lottery proposal copies word-for-word large portions of Georgia's lottery law Birmingham News, 10 October 1999; South Carolina Governor Jim Hodges' State of the State address notes that his education proposal is directly based on a North Carolina program 20 January 1999; Texas and New Jersey's new electricity deregulation laws are based on a Pennsylvania program which several legislators personally traveled to observe www.stateline.org, 27 September 1999. 8 These areas include judicial administration Glick 16 does not consider whether such emulation in uences the rate of policy innovation. It is this connection which the remainder of the paper investigates. 10 3 The Model
Setup
This section lays out the basic model extensions are considered in Section 4. There are two regions and two periods. In each period either a sure policy, which has a known payo , or an experimental policy, which has a payo drawn from a known distribution, must bepicked. The experimental payo s in the regions may be di erent but have a known correlation. Under decentralization each region has a policy-maker who selects a policy with the objective of maximizing the region's present discounted payo . Under centralization a single central policy-maker selects a common policy for both regions with the objective of maximizing the total present discounted payo .
More formally, label the regions as i = 1 ; 2 and the periods as t = 1 ; 2. Let a it 2 f 0; 1g be the action choice in region i, period t. a it = 1 indicates the experimental policy is used while a it = 0 indicates the sure policy is used. Under decentralization, the strategy for each region's policy-maker is an action for each period conditional on the history of play mixed actions are allowed. Under centralization, the strategy for the central policy-maker is an action to be applied in both regions for each period a 1t = a 2t . The main focus will be on comparing the level of experimentation in each case. My measure of aggregate experimentation is the sum of the rst period actions a 11 + a 21 . This experimentation measure excludes second period actions, since as will be made clear later all learning in this model is the result of rst period actions.
Each policy-maker discounts his second period payo with a common factor, 2 0; 1.
The payo from the sure policy is normalized to zero in both regions. The payo from the 10 The permanent p a yo mean, , and variance matrix, , m a y be written as, That is, j j measures the degree of dependence between the payo s. All parameters, actions and payo s are presumed to be common knowledge.
There is an important asymmetry between the two periods. In the rst period, the policymakers have beliefs about based simply on the distribution in 2. In the second period, the policy-makers may beable to re ne these beliefs if the experimental policy was used in the rst period. Notice that an experiment in one region provides useful information for the 11 The permanent term can be thought of as the expected net change in social welfare from implementing an innovative policy. The idiosyncratic term can be thought of as some uctuating aspect of the economic environment which in uences the policy outcome.
12 This is because experimental policies which are successful in one region may be less suited to another due to di erences in voter tastes, demographics, business composition, or economic health.
other region so long as 6 = 0. 13 After the rst period payo s are observed, DeGroot 13 shows that the Bayesian updated beliefs about follow a normal distribution. The updated distribution's mean, , will be important later. Prior to observing the rst period payo s, is itself normally distributed with mean, 
Decentralization
In the decentralized outcome each policy-maker selects actions which maximize his region's expected present discounted payo . The strategies are presumed to be subgame perfect, 13 The sure policy provides no information about the experimental payo distribution. 14 While a regional policy-maker typically learns more from his own experiments, this need not be the case. and so the equilibrium can beuncovered using backwards induction. In the second period policy-makers seek to maximize their current payo , since the game will end following this period. Each policy-maker will select the policy which has the highest expected reward given his current information, a i2 = 1 i 0
Here i is the expected value of policy-maker i's experimental payo given the rst period outcomes, and 0 is the expected payo from the sure policy.
The rst period choice is more complicated. The experimental policy provides useful information for the second period, and there is strategic interaction due to the informational externality between regions. Recall from 4 and 5 that given the initial beliefs, i is normally distributed with mean i and variance 2 i a 11 ; a 21 . The expected second period payo for policy-maker i is the probability the experimental policy will be the better choice times the expected experimental payo , V t=2 i a 11 ; a 21 The expectation operator E 1 is de ned with respect to the information available at the start of period one, x is the standard normal cumulative distribution and x is the standard normal density. The expected payo for 2 is written in an analogous fashion though reversing the arguments in V t=2
i : . These formulae partition the expected payo into a current ow the rst term and an informational bene t the second term. One assumption is needed before solving for the optimal rst period action. 1; 0 in the numerator. 11 states that a policy-maker will experiment with probability one if his neighboris unlikely to experiment, while he uses the sure policy if his neighb o r i s l i k ely to experiment. In the middle case of 11 the policy-maker is indi erent b e t ween the two actions and so is willing to mix.
I will focus on the case where a i1 2 0; 1 which means that neither policy-maker has a dominant action. 18 This is not only the theoretically most interesting scenario but is also the case with greatest real world relevance. This is because the experimental policy is unlikely to dominate the sure policy because then everyone would already be using the experimental policy and is also unlikely to bedominated by the sure policy because then no one would beconsidering the experimental policy.
Assumption 2 No Dominant Action
The parameters i , i , and satisfy a i1 2 0; 1 for i = 1 ; 2.
The assumption holds so long as i 2 L i ; i ; H i ;j j; 1 ; 2 for some L i H i 0 with @ H i =@j j 0. Assumption 2 is used only to simplify the exposition in the proofs. I discuss below h o w the key result is modi ed when it is violated. In equilibrium 11 must be satis ed for both policy-makers. If Assumption 2 holds then there will be a mixed action equilibrium with experimenting probabilities a i1 .
discusses several comparative statics of the mixed action equilibrium.
It is important to see whether the decentralized outcome is e cient. The social optimum is a strategy for each region which maximizes the total expected discounted payo of the region policy-makers. Appendix A.2 shows that the decentralized outcome typically involves weakly less aggregate experimentation than the social optimum. 20 The intuition is that each decentralized policy-maker ignores the informational bene t his experiment provides to his neighbor. Appendix A.2 also discusses a simple scheme which implements the rst best under decentralization.
Centralization
In the centralized outcome a single policy-maker maximizes the total expected present discounted payo of the two regions. However, he is restricted each period to selecting a single policy which is used in both regions. The backwards induction solution is analogous to the decentralized case. The optimal second period action follows a cuto rule based on the expected return from experimenting, The second equality follows because has a normal distribution with mean 1 This means that the optimal rst period action is to experiment, a 1 = 1, if and only if + e V t=2 1 is non-negative. Notice that only pure actions could be optimal.
The chief weakness of centralization is that it is restricted to uniform policies. When the regions are quite di erent, this will bea serious limitation because di erential policies are more appropriate. However, the main strength of centralization is that it internalizes all of the learning externalities of experimenting. This advantage is particularly important when the regions are similar so the learning externality is large. Appendix A.2 shows that centralization can involve aggregate over-or under-experimentation relative to the social optimum.
The main objective of this paper is to compare aggregate experimentation under centralization and decentralization.
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1-2, there exists a 0 such that aggregate experimentation is higher under centralization than decentralization if and only if .
Proof: See Appendix B.2.
To understand this result, recall that Assumption 2 implies that decentralization involves mixed actions in the rst period. Because centralization involves pure actions, it will be sufcient to consider the conditions which imply centralized experimentation. The permanent experimental correlation, , in uences the centralized payo through its e ect on 2 thus e V t=1 increases in 2 1 , centralized experimentation will only occur if is relatively large. Notice that centralized experimentation will not occur when is very negative despite the large learning potential. This is because a negative means the experimental policy is unlikely to be appropriate in both regions, and centralization is restricted to uniform policies. This result and the others in the remainder of the paper can be extended to allow for dominant actions Assumption 2 fails. When the experimental policy is dominant for one or more regions, Proposition 1 still holds though is smaller and possibly negative. When the sure policy is dominant for one or more regions, Proposition 1 still holds as long as neither or both i 's are extremely negative. 22 The one case where the Proposition cannot be extended is when only one i is extremely negative. Here there is no centralized experimentation because i 0 predominates while policy-maker ,i typically experiments under decentralization.
Experimentation is unambiguously higher under decentralization.
Proposition 1 focuses on how in uences centralized experimentation. The result can beextended to consider the di erence in aggregate experimentation between centralization and decentralization. 23 Corollary 1 Under Assumptions 1-2, when 0 the di erence in aggregate experimentation between centralization and decentralization is increasing in . Appendix B.2 shows that the centralized bene t of experimenting is always increasing in . This means that centralized experimentation is weakly increasing in . Corollary 1 follows because higher absolute values of decrease decentralized experimentation through the freerider e ect. 24 This result again suggests that greater regional similarity tends to promote centralized experimentation relative to decentralized experimentation.
Extensions

Arbitrary Numberof Regions
In this section I consider how the comparison between decentralization and centralization is altered by allowing for an arbitrary number of regions, multiple experimental policies and political yardstick competition. As with Assumption 1, numerical solutions indicate that the condition holds for almost all parameter values. I will continue to assume that no policy-maker has a dominant action 25 The model can also be extended to allow the idiosyncratic component of the experimental payo s to be correlated across regions. This correlation could re ect temporary phenomena which in uence all regions such as business cycles or taste fads. Details of this extension are contained in an earlier version of the paper which i s a vailable upon request. The proof characterizes N; N; e N. The intuition for condition i is similar to the two region case. A higher encourages centralized experimentation because it increases the potential reward from a successful rst period experiment. When N increases a centralized experiment in the rst period is more informative, since it becomes easier to disentangle the independent idiosyncratic and correlated permanent components. This means that the parameter space under which centralization involves more experimentation than decentralization grows with N. Condition ii occurs because a more negative also makes experiments more informative. However a more negative also means that the maximum possible second period centralized payo is reduced, since it is unlikely that the experimental policy will be uniformly favorable in all regions. For most values of N and all small or large values of N the latter e ect predominates and condition ii cannot hold. Proposition 2 can also be extended to consider the di erence in aggregate experimentation between centralization and decentralization. As N grows, the decentralized free-riding e ect becomes stronger. This is because each regional policy-maker only cares about the number of other policy-makers who experiment. When more neighbors experiment, the incentive to experiment decreases due to Assumption 3. Because of Proposition 2, this means that the di erence between centralized and decentralized experimentation grows with N.
Corollary 2 Under Assumptions 2-3, the di erence in aggregate experimentation between centralization and decentralization is increasing in N and when 0 is increasing in . 26 When the experimental policy is dominant for policy-maker i, then he is willing to experiment e v en if all of his neighbors do, i + V 
Multiple Experimental Policies
The next extension adds a second experimental policy option. This generalization is important because policies have multiple characteristics, and it is possible to experiment along each c haracteristic. Let a ijt bethe action of region i on policy j in period t. Denote the expected second period payo in region i as V t=2 i a 1A1 ; a 2A1 ; a 1B1 ; a 2B1 . In the second period decentralized policy-maker i uses whichever policy gives the highest expected return, V t=2 i a 1A1 ; a 2A1 ; a 1B1 ; a 2B1 = max a ij2 E 1 iA ; iB ; 0
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The values on the right hand side are the expected payo s from the two experimental policies conditional on the rst period actions and the sure policy. Under centralization, the i subscript is omitted and the experimental return is summed over the regions, j 1j + 2j . The addition of the second experimental policy does not change the centralized choice so long as j 1j + 2j is negative. This is because the centralized policy-maker is restricted to one policy per period, and he is indi erent between the ex ante identical experimental policies. If he does not use experimental policy j in the rst period, he does not learn about it and will not use it in the second period when j 0. For the two decentralized policy-makers, however, the experimental policies might be strategic complements. Each policy-maker may use a di erent experimental policy because this allows them to learn a bit about both policies. It is important to stress that each policy-maker is acting in a selfinterested fashion and still does not take into account the potential learning externality. Rather an experiment becomes less appealing to a policy-maker when his neighboris using it. This is because part of the bene t of experimenting with policy j is learning about its distribution, and a neighbor's experiment reduces the potential for learning through the 27 For example, welfare policies can have a maximum tenure length as well as a work requirement. 28 The results in this section can be extended to more general parameter values. free-rider e ect. Instead it may b e more informative to experiment with the other policy.
The de nition of aggregate experimentation must bemodi ed to account for the additional experimental policy. The measure should still capture the expected learning from rst period actions. Recall that V t=2 i : is a learning measure because it re ects how m uch beliefs are expected to shift due to the rst period actions. Therefore de ne aggregate experimentation with multiple policies to be V t=2 Even when centralization involves no experimentation, the decentralized policy-makers may each use di erent experimental policies. This is shown formally in Appendix B.4 for the case = ,1. The intuition is that negative correlation induces a decentralized freerider e ect on a particular experimental policy because a policy-maker's experiment is quite informative for his neighbor. Alternatively, a negative correlation means an experimental policy is unlikely to be e ective in both regions which reduces the centralized bene t of experimenting.
Political Yardstick Competition
It is sometimes argued that decentralization involves greater policy innovation because of political competition between regions. 30 The idea is that regional policy-makers are interested in running for higher o ce, and one way to signal e cacy to voters is to bethe rst to devise an innovative policy. Besley and Case 5 present one such model in which voters evaluate their local policy-maker based on the relative success of his scal policies compared to those of his neighbors. They refer to this as yardstick competition" because each 29 An equivalent de nition is to sum each region's maximum second period expected experimental variance. 30 For example in a discussion on welfare policy Wisconsin governor Tommy Thompson argued, But right now you've got governors who are so darn competitive. They don't want to read that they're not taking care of the poor, and they're not going to let a governor in an adjoining state get ahead of them. We're very competitive" The New York Times, 5 July 1998. policy-maker is evaluated using his neighbors' performance as the benchmark. This kind of race to introduce policy experiments might beabsent at the central level because the chief bene ciary of a centralized innovation, the central policy-maker, is unlikely to have further political aspirations.
While such y ardstick competition undoubtedly exists, whether it promotes decentralized policy innovation depends on the voter evaluation process. Assume that the regional payo s discussed in previous sections are some measure of regional voter welfare. Presume that the regional policy-makers are chie y concerned with maximizing their region's welfare, but they also have personal political ambitions. A policy-maker receives a p a yo bonus, G 0, if he wins the yardstick competition with his neighbor. Assume rst that the winner is the policymaker with the most successful experimental outcome in the rst period. Policy-maker 1's payo from 9 becomes, The payo from experimenting the top line has increased because of the possibility of winning the yardstick competition. The rst G term represents the probability of 1 winning when both experiment while the second G term is 1's guaranteed bonus when he is the only experimenter. The payo from not experimenting the bottom line is unchanged. Because similar incentives hold for policy-maker 2, it is not di cult to see that this sort of yardstick competition induces weakly higher aggregate experimentation. 31 Now suppose that the yardstick winner is the policy-maker with the highest rst period outcome regardless of which action is used. This means that a policy-maker can receive a bonus when he uses the sure policy if his neighbor's experiment performs poorly or if his 31 A similar result holds i if the bonus is only awarded when the experimental outcome is positive; or ii if the bonus is awarded to the policy-maker whose experimental outcome relative to expectations, i1 , i , is largest. is more successful than his neighbor's experiment the rst G term or than his neighbor's sure policy the second G term. When he uses the sure policy the bottom line, he wins if his neighbor's experiment is unsuccessful the rst G term, and he splits the bonus if neither experiment the second G term. When experimenting is non-dominant, i 0 and mixed actions are used. 32 Some algebra shows that both policy-makers place a smaller weight on experimenting relative to the case without yardstick competition. The intuition is that the immediate payo from the sure policy is higher than from the experimental policy, and so a policy-maker is more likely to win G if he uses the sure policy. It is therefore impossible to determine whether yardstick competition increases decentralized policy experimentation without specifying the voter evaluation process.
Conclusion
In this paper I investigate the role of government decentralization in the policy innovation process. Contrary to conventional wisdom, local governments need not be better innovators than the central government. While each local government can simultaneously consider a di erent policy, they each ignore the external bene t of their choice: when any one government experiments with a policy, all governments learn about its potential feasibility. Local governments may forego experimenting and free-ride o the experience of their neighbors. In contrast the central government is able to internalize these informational externalities but is restricted to using a single policy at any moment. Centralization results in greater exper- 32 When experimenting is dominant, then the yardstick competition described here has no e ect. This paper can help analyze the e ect on innovation of the recent U.S. welfare reform see Blank 8 for details. The shift of federal aid from matching to block grants might discourage experimentation. This is because matching but not block grants increase with the level of state spending, and experimental policies such as Wisconsin's training program tend to be quite expensive see Wiseman 35 . Alternatively, the welfare reform also streamlined or eliminated the time consuming waiver applications which states formerly had to complete in order to use a policy experiment. This change is likely to induce more innovation. It would beinteresting to formally evaluate such changes in a model which adds institutional detail to the framework presented here.
This analysis also has empirical implications. Previous empirical work on decentralized policy innovation has ignored the role of inter-state or inter-region heterogeneity. A reasonable strategy for future research would beto measure the correlation across states in some objective policy outcome. For example one could calculate the correlation across states in poverty or single motherhood rates when welfare term limits are imposed. Another example is to see whether community policing has a uniform e ect on crime rates. These data could then be used to test implications of the model, such as the prediction that greater inter-state heterogeneity increases the rate of innovation under decentralization. This paper makes the simplifying assumption that centralization and decentralization di er only in whether learning externalities are internalized and whether di erentiated policies can be implemented. The model can be extended to consider other potential di erences. First, the assumption that decentralized policy payo s are independent across regions could berelaxed. In reality local policy outcomes are likely to beinter-related, say because one state's generous welfare program attracts migrants from less generous states. Decentralized experimentation is likely to be relatively larger smaller if such externalities are negative positive. Second, there could beinformation asymmetries. The central government may have limited information about the preferences of each region though it might be better informed about the degree of similarity between regions. It is not clear whether such informational di erences will induce more or less centralized experimentation. Third, the central government may have a more skilled bureaucracy and may enjoy returns to scale in policy research and program evaluation. This suggests the central government might initially select more promising experimental policies which should increase the relative level of centralized experimentation. This also suggests that the central government could learn more from previous experience than do local governments. While this modi cation should encourage centralized experimentation, it is also likely to increase decentralized experimentation through a reduction in the free-rider e ect. Fourth, there may bedi erences in risk aversion. The central government may bemore inclined to experiment because a bad outcome in one region may beo set by a favorable outcome in a second region. Such implicit insurance is unavailable to local governments. If policy-makers have a strong aversion to negative outcomes, this is likely to result in relatively more centralized experimentation. Fully investigating these extensions are interesting topics for future research. Under mixed actions an increase in j j decreases each policy-maker's propensity to experiment. This is because as the regions become more similar or dissimilar, the policy-makers are able to learn more from their neighbor's experiment. Experimentation is therefore reduced because of Assumption 1. Also under mixed actions, an increase in i only in uences ,i's actions as illustrated in Figure 1 . 33 However, an increase in i may make the experimental policy the dominant choice for policy-maker i. In this case i uses the experimental policy with probability one and ,i free-rides and does not experiment. This reduces aggregate experimentation. Analogous reasoning can be applied when an increase in i initiates a shift from just region ,i experimenting to a mixed action equilibrium. These cases are illustrated in Figure 2 .
The comparative statics have implications for empirical work. They suggest that it might be inappropriate to extrapolate the e cacy of some experimental policy based on the experience of the rst adopting regions. This is because the pioneer regions are likely to have unusual characteristics such as low i values. 34 An earlier version of this paper available upon request presents additional comparative statics and contains more detailed discussions of these points.
A.2 The Social Optimum
The social optimum is a strategy for each region which maximizes the total expected discounted payo of the region policy-makers. 21 . The social optimum di ers from the decentralized outcome in that it explicitly takes into account the learning externality. This is because 21 includes payo s for both policy-makers. The social optimum di ers from the centralized outcome in that it can assign di erent actions to the two regions.
Remark 3 Decentralized Under-experimentation Suppose that only pure actions are allowed under decentralization and Assumption 1 holds. Then the decentralized outcome exhibits weak aggregate under-experimentation relative to the social optimum.
Proof: See Appendix B.6.
The intuition is straightforward. Neither decentralized policy-maker considers that his experiment bene ts his neighbor. This reasoning does not always hold when decentralized mixed actions are used. Under certain parameter values, the social optimum involves one region experimenting while the decentralized outcome involves each region using the experimental policy with probability near one. Decentralization then has a higher level of aggregate experimentation. 35 Figure 3 illustrates this case in the portion where is near 0:5.
For policy purposes it is interesting to consider schemes for decentralizing the social optimum. Presume that a central planner knows all of the relevant parameters but is unable to directly change them. However, he can impose a set of subsidies or taxes on the regions conditioned on their policy choices. Presume also that the subsidies and taxes must exactly balance. If the parameters imply under-experimentation, then a simple tax on rst period 
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This scheme lowers the sure policy payo when the other policy-maker is experimenting and is like a conditional increase in i . By appropriately setting it is always possible to induce the social optimum.
37
Notice that 22 need not involve actual transfers in equilibrium, but rather it is the threat of a penalty which induces policy-makers to pick the appropriate action. This sort of scheme seems to work in practice. When the federal government subsidizes policy experiments, Welch and Thompson 34 nd that innovative policies have di used more rapidly among U.S. states.
The comparison between the centralized outcome and the social optimum is more complicated.
Remark 4 Centralized Over-and Under-experimentation The centralized optimum may exhibit aggregate over-or under-experimentation relative to the social optimum.
The intuition is that a very high or low expected experimental payo in one region may swamp the expected return in the other region. In this case the social optimum may i n volve one region experimenting while the centralized outcome may involve experimentation with probability one or zero. The simplest example of this is 1 ! ,1 and 2 = 2 where 2 is de ned in Appendix B.2. In this case the social optimum has one region experimenting while the centralized outcome has experimentation with probability zero. The sure policy is non-dominant Assumption 2. Therefore, the sure policy must give policy-maker i a l o wer payo than the experimental policy when ,i is using the sure policy Now the right hand side of 37 is independent of see 24 while I showed above that the left hand side is increasing in . To prove the result, it will besu cient to nd some for which 37 holds. When = 1, Cov 1; The proof proceeds by nding conditions under which the two decentralized policy-makers use di erent experimental policies. The rst step is to show that it may be optimal for a policy-maker to use experimental policy j rather than ,j when his neighbor is using ,j. This When the inequalities in the last two paragraphs hold, there is a decentralized equilibrium where the policy-makers use di erent experimental policies. 40 This is because the above results show that the optimal response to a neighbor's experiment is to use the other experimental policy. Now the previous paragraphs show that the policy-makers' second period return is maximized when each experiments with a di erent policy. This means aggregate experimentation is higher under decentralization than centralization, since the latter can 39 It is not possible to formally prove this point since @ V only involve a one policy experiment. Notice also that decentralization can have both experimental policies being used even when centralization has no experimentation at all. When = ,1, Cov 1; 1 = , 2 1; 1 and so using 15 2 1 = 0. This means that centralization will not involve experimentation so long as 0 while the above analysis shows that decentralization can involve each policy-maker using a di erent experimental policy.
Q:E:D:
B. These results show that the social optimum always involves pure actions.
The next step is to show that decentralization exhibits weak under-experimentation when pure actions must be used. The proof proceeds by using 52 and 53 to partition the parameter space. I will assume that i 0 because otherwise it is clear that the decentralized and social optima involve both policy-makers experimenting with probability one. 
